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Background: This paper explores the implementation and sustenance of universal health coverage (UHC) in Costa
Rica, discussing the development of a social security scheme that covered 5% of the population in 1940, to one
that finances and provides comprehensive healthcare to the whole population today. The scheme is financed by
mandatory, tri-partite social insurance contributions complemented by tax funding to cover the poor.
Methods: The analysis takes a historical perspective and explores the policy process including the key actors and
their relative influence in decision-making. Data were collected using qualitative research instruments, including a
review of literature, institutional and other documents, and in-depth interviews with key informants.
Results: Key lessons to be learned are: i) population health was high on the political agenda in Costa Rica, in particular
before the 1980s when UHC was enacted and the transfer of hospitals to the social security institution took place.
Opposition to UHC could therefore be contained through negotiation and implemented incrementally despite the
absence of real consensus among the policy elite; ii) since the 1960s, the social security institution has been responsible
for UHC in Costa Rica. This institution enjoys financial and managerial autonomy relative to the general government,
which has also facilitated the UHC policy implementation process; iii) UHC was simultaneously constructed on three
pillars that reciprocally strengthened each other: increasing population coverage, increasing availability of financial
resources based on solidarity financing mechanisms, and increasing service coverage, ultimately offering
comprehensive health services and the same benefits to every resident in the country; iv) particularly before the 1980s,
the fruits of economic growth were structurally invested in health and other universal social policies, in particular
education and sanitation. The social security institution became a flagship of Costa Rica’s national development
strategy which reinforced its political importance and contributed to its longer-term sustainability and that of UHC.
Conclusions: UHC has been achieved in Costa Rica because it was supported at the highest political level within a
favourable socio-economic and political context. Once achieved, UHC became an entitlement for the population and
now enjoys broad public support.
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Universal health coverage (UHC) is high on the global
health agenda [1]. In particular, low- and middle-income
countries are explicitly encouraged by the global health
community to move towards UHC despite their rela-
tively scarce resources. Within this context it is useful to
explore how some of these countries have already moved
in that direction. The analysis in this paper focuses on* Correspondence: jorine.muiser@gmail.com
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and 2000 during which time UHC was achieved. The
scheme has been sustained until today with 88% of the 4.6
million Costa Ricans being covered since the 1990s. Today,
total health spending represents 11% of GDP in Costa Rica
with public health spending accounting for around 70%
[2]. Since 2000, total health expenditure has increased rap-
idly, mainly in the form of private health expenditure.
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curity fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, CCSS)
was founded based on social protection for manual and
‘white-collar’ workers. The scheme was included in the
country’s Constitution from the outset. During the sec-
ond period (1961–1980), the CCSS was mandated to
make its coverage universal within a period of 10 years.
The Hospital Transfer Act of 1973 transformed the
CCSS from a merely financing institution into the main
hospital care provider in the country. At the time, pri-
mary health care was being provided by the Health Minis-
try, particularly in marginal urban centres and rural areas.
During the third period (1981–2000), primary health care
was integrated into the CCSS scheme through the estab-
lishment of health posts throughout the country in pro-
portion to the population. From that moment on, the
Health Ministry would strengthen its role as health system
steward, which it already had in formal terms since 1983.
By the end of the century, Costa Rica had evolved into an
upper-middle economy, and the CCSS transformed into
the single, universal and comprehensive health care finan-
cer and provider it is today.
Costa Rica’s achievements in terms of UHC may seem
straightforward, but the road was long and rough. The
objective of the analysis presented in this paper is to
identify key actors in the three consecutive health re-
form periods, their relative influence in the health policy
process and the context in which they operated;
remaining challenges are also defined.
Methods
Qualitative methods were used to collect data, including
a review of the literature (published research, grey litera-
ture, newspaper articles and formal, institutional docu-
ments), as well as two sets of interviews with a total of
47 key informants and one focus group discussion. The
literature was used to understand the historical context
of the three health reform periods and the institution
building process related to the achievement of UHC, as
well as to collect statistics showing progress over time in
terms of economic development, population coverage,
and health system financing and outcomes.
The first set of open-ended interviews was used to
identify historic landmarks and events as well as key ac-
tors in the three consecutive health reform processes. A
total of 29 interviews were carried out with three groups
of informants: key policy actors (former Ministers and
CCSS CEO’s), key CCSS and Ministry of Health officials
(at different levels and responsibilities), and researchers
in relevant fields. Questions focused on the political
agendas of the different actors, their relative power, the
changes occurring due to social and economic context-
ual factors, and the degree of development of the health
system. Reich’s actor mapping framework [3], a softwareprogram specifically designed to undertake actor map-
ping as part of policy analysis, was used to record the in-
formants’ views and statements. The software produced
a table as output that helped identify actors and explore
their relative political power in the policy process.
The second set of semi-structured interviews was used
to deepen information about the actual role of the key ac-
tors, the way they coordinated their actions, how the UHC
policy was actually implemented and future challenges.
The interviewees were policy and institutional actors all of
whom had participated in one or more of the health re-
form processes: ex-health ministers, ex-CCSS CEO´s,
Health Ministry or CCSS officials, private sector health
professionals, policy analysts and beneficiaries. The focus
group formed part of this second set of semi-structured
interviews, using an interview guide with the same topics.
The group consisted of four medical doctors, two each
from the Ministry of Health and the CCSS. The topics that
guided the semi-structured interviews and focus group
also informed the literature review and coding exercises.
Walt and Gilson’s framework [4] was applied and an
analysis was undertaken of the context, content and
process of the reforms. Following this framework, the
content of the policy is important but the focus of the
analysis is on how these policies are implemented, i.e.,
the process. The objective of the analysis is to under-
stand key actors’ behaviour within the margins of those
formal rules and given their specific context.
Responses were compared across interviewees and
with statistics and information from other sources. This
facilitated the triangulation of the information retrieved
from different sources to identify the most widely sup-
ported arguments.
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of
Costa Rica and WHO, and all interviewees and focus
group discussion participants signed an informed con-
sent form.
Findings about the process of UHC development
Key informants explained, and literature confirms, that
Costa Rica started to develop its democratic social in-
vestment approach in the 1890 s focusing mostly on
education policies. While the country was poor and iso-
lated, its policy elite, having often studied abroad, sought
to modernize it. Up to 1940s, there was slow and limited
economic growth with three noteworthy developments:
i) primary education was made compulsory in 1888, ii)
the Ministry of Health was established in 1922, and iii)
democratic institutions started flourishing [5-7].
First period of major reform
The 1940s brought the first major phase of health re-
form when President Calderon founded the CCSS. This
public, autonomous institution started by providing
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collar’ workers living in urban areas. Medical doctors
opposed the move fearing they would lose their niche of
the market and started a labour union. The CCSS was
also not welcomed by some members of the Cabinet and
many others across the political spectrum, as depicted in
Figure 1. Despite this opposition, President Calderon
created a coalition of actors to support the reform; he
was crucially important in the reform being adopted as
he enjoyed a lot of power (black background in Figure 1).
At the other end of the spectrum the physicians’ labour
union strongly opposed the reform, but it had less
power. Their opposition to the scheme was resolved by
negotiation, whereby they would be allowed to work as
public sector employees for the CCSS while keeping
their private practices open as well. Other actors, for ex-
ample the press and Congress, are in the middle of the
figure because they had no strong interest in the reform,
as key informants confirm.1940´s
1970´s
1990´s
Figure 1 Key actors behind the reforms. Source: Elaboration by authorsKey indicators for the end of the first ten years of in-
stitution building serve as a baseline against which to
benchmark the impact of later developments. By 1950,
the total population of Costa Rica was almost one mil-
lion, with youth (0–15 years age) and elderly (65 years
and older) representing 43% and 3.4% of total popula-
tion, respectively. Total fertility was 6.7 per woman and
life expectancy at birth 56 years for both sexes. Health
care expenditure was 2.2% of GDP and the CCSS cov-
ered around 8% of the population [8]. A weak, but grow-
ing health system had begun to develop as is further
shown in Table 1 and Figure 2.
Second period of major reform
Thirty years from the founding of the CCSS, the socio-
economic and epidemiological context had changed and
a window of opportunity opened for the second reform.
Four noteworthy features mark this period: i) the econ-
omy expanded (6% annual growth on average with stable.
Table 1 Milestones in the making of Costa Rica’s national
health system, 1941–2010
Year Policy measure Coverage %
1941 CCSS is founded, providing health insurance
for urban workers with wages up to
$ 52.63 a month
3.0
1949 The new Constitution retains the three-fold
symmetrical financing (employers, workers
and government); management remains
at CCSS
6.8
1954 Health insurance covers the spouse 11.9
1959 The salary ceiling rises to $ 149.25 a month 15.1
1961 Insurance coverage is declared universal with
a ten year grace period
17.7
1962 Health insurance was extended to rural workers 20.3
1965 Health insurance was extended for the
whole family
30.6
1970 Phasing out the salary cap 47.1
1971 Compulsory retirement insurance affiliation
for all workers
51.5
1972 Health insurance for college students 53.8
1973 All private hospitals are transferred to CCSS;
government pays health insurance for
extreme poverty citizens
58.4
1974 Retirement insurance to all elderly poor 60.3
1975 Voluntary health insurance and retirement
insurance coverage
59.6
1976 Retirees under special schemes become eligible
for health insurance
61.8
1984 Insurance arrangement under presumptive
income (for self-employed and farmers)
83.9
1995 Compulsory health insurance for retirement
insurance retired workers
86.4
1996 Universal student health insurance 89.7
2001 Worker Protection Act grants new legal
instruments against tax evasion and forces
self-employed to join the health insurance
scheme
87.5
2005 Health insurance for vulnerable people
(poor, indigenous and rural poor) paid by
Government
87.6
Source: Adapted from Rodríguez A., Working Paper for Estado de la Nación,
2010 [9].
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(both in terms of legislation and organizational develop-
ment); iii) the fight against infectious diseases was suc-
cessful to the extent they were no longer the leading
cause of death (Figure 2); and iv) good health care at low
cost was being delivered [10]. The political context
changed and new actors took the stage. The second
health reform started with the 1961 Social Security
Universalization Act.
The Act instructed the CCSS to universalize the scheme
within a period of ten years. Table 1 demonstrates how
new segments of the population were brought in one byone, ultimately resulting in near universal population
coverage by the 1990s. Key informants explain the unique-
ness of the process: “It was a very risky project as no other
Latin American country had universal social insurance
like the one we wanted to establish; and on top of that, it
gave the Government the direct responsibility to realize this
universal availability of medical services” (interview with
former Health Minister). In most Latin American coun-
tries, social security was and still is reserved to formal sec-
tor workers whereas informal workers and the poor
depend on the medical services provided by their respect-
ive health ministries. These generally neither guarantee
availability of quality health care nor financial risk protec-
tion. During the past 20 years, UHC has risen on the
health policy agenda across the region, but apart from
Cuba and Brazil with their tax-based schemes, Costa Rica
remains the only country with effective and equitable near
universal health coverage based on social health insurance.
The 1973 Hospital Transfer Act was drafted by a think-
tank at the Ministry of Health. The Act was a key step in the
universalization process, as it recognized that universal
health care needed all hospitals to accept and treat patients
under uniform rules, medicines to be provided in a homoge-
neous waya and the whole population to be covered under
the same conditions. Until then, there had been a loosely or-
ganized not-for-profit quasi-private hospital establishment
owned and managed by the Social Protection Board, that
was funded from lottery sales and operated through a mix-
ture of charity and market norms. The CCSS at the time
owned three hospitals along with a network of clinics. The
Health Ministerb knew a national hospital network was
needed to achieve universal access to required care and
financial protection, and while the politics were not simple,
the Act was adoptedc. For the next decade, all of those hospi-
tals were gradually brought under the control of the CCSS, a
process that is unique within the Latin American region.
At the time, the CCSS did not have enough financial or
human capitald to effectively maintain the national hos-
pital network. It faced a financial predicament, not only
because it was extending population coverage, but also be-
cause the Government did not always pay its portion of
the tri-partite (employers, employees and the government)
contribution arrangement agreed to in the 1940s. New fi-
nancing mechanisms were implemented, including the
elimination of the previously applied wage ceiling so that
higher income workers would be drawn in; and the trans-
fer of revenue from a new tax on cigarettes to the CCSS in
the 1960s [6]. The accumulating debt by the government
to the CCSS would become a recurrent problem. On the
other hand, the Medical Union’s resistance to the scheme
faded away because the universal availability of medical
services meant more employment for them, and as men-
tioned earlier, they had been allowed to keep their private
practices open [6,8,11].
Sources: CCP and Rosero (1985)
Figure 2 Five most important causes of death.
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across the political spectrum, as shown in the middle
section of Figure 1. President Figueres played a crucial
leadership role as the health policy struggle had
deadlocked before he stepped ine. A key informant con-
firmed that the President, in settling the debate on the
Hospital Transfer Act with the aim to transform the
CCSS into a kind of NHS, as the British tax-based Uni-
versal Health Coverage system is known, clarified his
view in this way: “I want the Ministry and the CCSS
working together, not fighting, as it was the tradition.
This project would bring them together” (interview with
former CCSS CEO). At that time, the Health Ministry
maintained responsibility for the provision of primary
health care and the idea was that it would start referring
patients to the CCSS hospitals.
The middle section of Figure 1 shows that the oppos-
ition to the transfer of hospitals came in particular from
the side of the labour unions and politicians who argued
that the universal coverage process was uncontrollable.
So did the CCSS management who feared that the trans-
fer would financially cripple the institution, as no fees
would be charged for servicesf, and lottery funding
would disappear. Their concerns also related to the tasks
involved in growing from managing three single hospi-
tals to a full hospital network covering the whole coun-
try. Even the Pan-American Health Organization
ventured out of its technical role and voiced itsopposition to the hospital transfer plan [11]. However,
the Act was adopted and implementation initiated. Key
informants agree: “The transfer of hospitals was enacted,
it was part of the universalization plan. It was a political
decision: why would the social security institution build its
own hospitals? The transfer was a traumatic experience for
many, but it was a decision taken with no consensus at
that moment” (Focus group 1). Notably, in most Latin
American countries except for Costa Rica, social security
institutions did build their own hospitals further contrib-
uting to the development of highly fragmented and often
inequitable health systems.
While it was no easy juncture, the far right section on
Figure 1 being empty means that no actor was highly
opposed to the reform. Key actors confirm that this was
due to evidence on improvements in terms of equity and
population health. Figure 3 maps the distribution of hos-
pitals across the country since the 1980s.
Forty years of the CCSS contributed to demographic
and epidemiological changes. The total population grew to
approximately two million inhabitants. Elders and youth
represented 3.8% and 46% of the total population, respect-
ively, at a dependence rate peak. Infant mortality de-
creased to 21 per 1,000 live births; fertility rates to 3.7 per
woman. CCSS population coverage grew nine-fold
reaching 39% by 1980. Babies were delivered at health fa-
cilities more than three times as often as in 1950 thus im-
proving maternal mortality rates. The number of hospital
H1 H. San Juan de Dios H13 H. San Carlos
H2 H. Calderón Guardia H14 H. Enrique Baltodano
H3 H. México H15 H. Escalante Padilla
H4 H. San Rafael de Alajuela H16 H. Golfito
H5 H. San Vicente de Paul H17 H. Tomás Casas
H6 H. Max Peralta H18 H. Los Chiles
H7 H. William Allen H19 H. Max Teran
H8 H. Tony Facio H20 H. Upala
H9 H. Carlos Luis Valverde Vega H21 H. San Francisco de Asis
H10 H. Monseñor Sanabria H22 H. Ciudad Neilly
H11 H. Guápiles H23 H. San Vito
H12 H. Anexión
Figure 3 Map of hospitals and health care districts [9,12,13]. Source: Elaboration by authors.
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medical doctors almost tripled; life expectancy increased
to almost 70 years at birth for both sexes [11]. Health care
expenditure was 5.1% of GDP, with per capita real health
expenditure 1.8 times higher than when the CCSS was
founded. Importantly, the investments in health were ac-
companied by the implementation of other universal so-
cial policies as part of a wider national development
strategy. The latter resulted in the population with access
to water reaching 75% by 1980, one and a half times
higher than in 1950, and population with sanitation up to
86% [8] (Table 1 and Figure 2). The socio-economic devel-
opments notably improved the lives of Costa Rica’s
inhabitants.Third period of major reform
The third health reform was implemented during the
1990s when at the global level primary healthcare was the
key strategy. The experiences from the hospital transfer
process and lessons learnt from the primary healthcare
delivery programs carried out by the Ministry of Health
during the 1970s and 1980s, informed the design of a new
primary healthcare program in Costa Rica. Key informants
acknowledge the impact made by those earlier programs:
“The [Health Ministry’s] Rural Health program was the
revolution … A nurse and a technical assistant were the
key players. That is when the revolution started: control of
parasites, nutrition, latrines, water pumps, vaccinations,
and a lot of health education, basic sanitation and
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gram” (Focus group).
By that time, the CCSS had matured sufficiently to
transform into an NHS-type system, ready to finance and
deliver universal health care through solidarity funding
mechanisms, with revenue from general taxation comple-
menting social insurance contributions to cover the costs
of those with no capacity to pay. Entitlement to health ser-
vices would indeed become synonymous with being a
Costa Rican. That is probably the single most important
feature of the Costa Rican social fabricg.
The primary healthcare reform was not as contested
as previous ones were and it was not politically driven as
is shown in the lower part of Figure 1h. No actor was at
the far right representing a high level of opposition, or
the far left representing a high level of support. The
Presidents of that period did not play a crucial role.
Regarding this reform, multinational donor agencies
had agreed to support it, but they did not drive it as the
national policy elite managed to negotiate its vision. Key
informants confirm that, against the will of the donors,
medical doctors were integrated into the basic health
teams that spread out over the country: “We could im-
pose our own model, because we do not depend finan-
cially on the donors. Other countries do what the donor
wants” (Focus group 1). Two grants provided by the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank
supported the integration of primary health care within
the CCSS and the strengthening of the Health Ministry’s
role as steward.
The reform strategy was that to allocate a health post
(EBAIS) per 1,000 households (or 4,000 persons) across
the country [10]. Figure 3 shows how health-areas, the
sizes of which were related to population density, were
established all over the country. This was an important
improvement in terms of access to care, as the Health
Ministry’s primary care program had not achieved uni-
versality. Today, 94% of the population has access to a
primary health care post [14] and while not functioning
optimally as yet, a referral network from the primary
health care teams to the less and more specialized hospi-
tals in the regional and national centres of the country is
in place. Overall, evidence has shown that after the third
health reform, both general population health and equity
improved in Costa Rica [15]. Consequently, while out-of
-pocket payments are substantial, no catastrophic health
expenditure occurs in Costa Rica [16].
In terms of financing, the third reform triggered the
2000 Workers’ Act that made affiliation to the CCSS
mandatory also for the self-employed. Until today, the
CCSS maintains its financial and managerial autonomy
and finances its services based on social insurance con-
tributions complemented by payments by the govern-
ment to cover the poor. Due to a lack of efficiency inresource management, increasing health care costs re-
lated to the demographic and epidemiological transition
and to the availability of more and more expensive treat-
ments day by day, the financial situation of the CCSS
has become increasingly critical over the past decades.
Previously, the expansion process could be temporarily
stopped during such times, but today, with UHC princi-
pally in place, more structural solutions must be found.
While the CCSS has become stricter in controlling eva-
sion and late payment by employers and the working
part of the population, over the past decades, the general
government regularly has failed to pay its contributions
in a timely fashion. Where the expansion of UHC was
driven from the highest political level before the 1980s,
since then, population demand has apparently contrib-
uted more significantly to sustaining it.
The 20th century closed with the CCSS turning sixty
years old within an increasingly complex context. The
total population was close to four million and the de-
pendence ratio was 59, indicating that children did no
longer die of preventable causes and women were not
having children in excess of those they wanted. Infant
mortality declined to 10.2 per 1,000 live births and total
fertility to 2.4 per woman; life expectancy at birth in-
creased to 78 years for both sexes. CCSS population
coverage was 88% and health expenditure reached 8% of
GDP. Social system improvements also continued with
97% of the population having access to drinkable water
[8] (Table 1 and Figure 2).
Remaining challenges
Costa Rica’s health system, as any other in the world, con-
tinues to face important challenges. Most key informants
agree on the following ones: i) UHC has been achieved,
but small pockets of the population are still excluded; ii)
UHC once achieved needs to be sustained, which is more
difficult today due to the demographic and epidemio-
logical transitions as well as to changing political and eco-
nomic contexts; iii) the need for improvements in health
service quality and better management of waiting lists
have become increasingly important in order to control
growth in private spending; iv) advances in health technol-
ogy create demand for new and more expensive interven-
tions; and v) the CCSS finds itself in a self-proclaimed
management crisis that has provoked a public debate
about its institutional base.
Limitations
Data collection for this study was limited given that only
a few key actors from the first reform period are still
alive, and that historic processes in general are scarcely
documented in Costa Rica. With regard to the second
and third reform period, it was found that differences in
key actors’ perceptions were sometimes blurred by the
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employees, ever since primary healthcare was inte-
grated in the CCSS scheme. Furthermore, available
time and resource constraints limited the number of
interviews.Conclusions
This study outlines the UHC development process in
Costa Rica. Incremental reforms were implemented to
build the system in a way that was flexible enough to ad-
just to the changing context. The CCSS developed from
a small institution created for less than 5% of the popu-
lation into what is called the largest ‘company’ in Central
America.
The most important lessons observed are: i) popula-
tion health was high on the political agenda in Costa
Rica, in particular before the 1980s when UHC was
enacted and the transfer of hospitals to the social secur-
ity institution took place. Opposition to UHC could
therefore be contained through negotiation and the
UHC implementation process became incremental and
continuous despite the absence of real consensus among
the policy elite; ii) UHC in Costa Rica has been placed
since the 1960s under the responsibility of the social se-
curity institution that enjoys financial and managerial
autonomy relative to the general government. This con-
struction has facilitated the UHC policy implementation
process to be incremental and continuous; iii) UHC was
simultaneously constructed on three pillars that were re-
ciprocally strengthened: increasing population coverage,
increasing availability of financial resources based on
solidarity financing mechanisms, and increasing cover-
age with, ultimately, comprehensive health services of-
fering the same benefits to every resident in the country;
iv) in particular before the 1980s, the fruits of economic
growth were structurally invested in health and other
universal social policies, in particular education and
sanitation. The social security institution became a flag-
ship of Costa Rica’s national development strategy,
which reinforced its political importance and contrib-
uted to its longer-term sustainability and that of UHC.
UHC has been achieved in Costa Rica not because
there was consensus about its importance from the be-
ginning, but because it was pushed from the highest pol-
itical level within a favourable socio-economic context.
Once achieved, UHC became an entitlement for the
whole population and started to enjoy broad popular
support. The responsibility of implementing the UHC
policy fell under a social security institution that enjoys
financial and managerial autonomy relative to the gen-
eral government, which has contributed to the sustain-
ability of the scheme even at times when contextual
factors became less favourable.Endnotes
aThe CCSS has always provided medicines with no
payment whatsoever.
bHe was a close friend of the President and a very
prestigious physician.
cIt was also supported by the General Health and
Health Ministry’s Organic Act.
dThe first medical school in Costa Rica was founded in
1961.
eHe enacted two laws to support the reform process
and to formalize the rules of the game for actors within
the national health system.
fAs in many historical instances, important objectives
are in conflict. Universal care will improve equity, but it
could undermine NHS finances.
gCo-movement of health and education is very import-
ant as Costa Rican social accomplishments show.
hBlack background for an actor indicates high power,
grey means medium power and white means low power.
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